CONFLICT OF LAWS-DiscovERY-Swiss
PELLED

To

TRADING-

BANKS CAN BE COM-

DISCLOSE IDENTITIES OF CLIENTS SUSPECTED OF INSIDER

Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della

Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Efforts to police international transactions on the American securities market have been frustrated for decades by the Swiss banking
privilege.' This difficulty arises because Swiss banks trading on the
American securities market 2 are prevented by Swiss banking law from
disclosing the identities of their clients. 3 Thus, American enforcement
agencies are prevented from ascertaining the identities of those indi4
viduals who might fraudulently trade on the American market.
American officials believe such undiscoverable fraudulent activity
threatens the integrity of the securities market, 5 thereby diminishing
the investing public's confidence in the market.
Against this background, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana8 (SEC v. BSI) ordered a Swiss
bank to reveal to the Securities and Exchange Commission the identities of customers suspected of insider trading, even though disclosure
would violate Swiss law and might result in possible criminal sanctions against bank officers. 7 This exercise of American jurisdiction and
extraterritorial application of American securities law to foreign defendants, 8 may lead to international complications. 9
See Kelly, United States Foreign Policy: Efforts To PenetrateBank Secrecy in Switzerland
from 1940 to 1975, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 211 (1976); see also H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4394, 4397 [hereinafter cited as HouSE
REPORT].

2 Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1972) (Swiss banks
may act as stockbrokers).
3 See infra note 183.
1 See HOUSE RETor, supra note 1, at 13-14, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4397-98; 116 CONG. REc. 32,627-28 (1970).
See 116 CONG. REC. 32,627 (1970).
92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
7 Id. at 119.
8 See generally Hacker & Rotunda, The ExtraterritorialRegulation of Foreign Business
Under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1981); Loss, Extraterritorialityin the
Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 305 (1979).
1 See Onkelinx, Conflict of International jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 487, 507-09 (1969); Note, Power
to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1097, 1100, 1102 (1981) (discussing foreign retaliatory legislation or action in
response to American discovery efforts abroad) [hereinafter cited as Note, British Clawback];
Note, Ordering Productionof Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. CHI.
L. Ray. 791, 797-98 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, Ordering Production of Documents];
Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Develop-
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Additionally, different legal viewpoints have evolved from this
conflict between American discovery laws and Swiss nondisclosure
laws. American courts maintain that their law should control procedure, 10 while others relying on international law maintain that deference be granted to foreign law thus resulting in greater restraint by
the American courts." This Note will examine the depth of the competing American and Swiss interests and review the propriety of judicial action in this internationally sensitive area.
On March 10, 1981, Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (BSI), a Swiss
bank, purchased 1055 call options and 3000 shares of St. Joe Minerals
Corporation (St. Joe) common stock 12 for certain undisclosed purchasers. 13 The call options and stock were traded through two brokerdealers on the Philadelphia and the New York Stock Exchanges respectively. 14 At the time of the purchase the price of the stock was
ments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L
L. 747 n.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Recent Developments]; see also infra note 171 and
accompanying text.
"0 Lexfori is the term used for the concept that the law of the forum controls procedure. See
Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953), modified and af-'d
sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 937 (1956); Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 748 n.4. See generally 3 J. BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1600 (1935), cited in Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic
Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L. J. 612, 614 (1979).
1 In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). International comity is the
recognition of the judicial, legislative, or executive acts of a foreign country. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); see also
Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 530 (international comity should be considered as one factor in
defining jurisdiction); Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 748 n.5 (international
comity evidences recognition of foreign sovereignty). But cf. Note, Ordering Production of
Documents, supra note 9, at 794-96 (since comity is used in many senses, it is not binding
principle).
l1 92 F.R.D. at 113. A call option permits its holder to call for securities at a fixed price in a
stated quantity within a stated period. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). St. Joe,
a diversified producer of natural resources, is a New York corporation registered pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its corporate securities are listed and traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. In this transaction, however, its options were traded only on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Amended Complaint of Plaintiff at 4, Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Amended Complaint of Plaintiff].
11 Subsequent discovery revealed that three Panamanian companies: Transatlantic Financial
Co., S.A. (TFCO), Nayarit Investment, S.A. (NICO), and Finvest Underwriters and Dealers
(Finvest Panama) had securities trading accounts with BSI. On behalf of these companies,
Giuseppe Tome, a registered representative with Baird-Patrick & Co., instructed BSI to effect
the transactions in question. Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, supra note 12, at 2-5; see also
in-ra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
" 92 F.R.D. at 112. The call options were traded by Becker, a registered broker-dealer and a
member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange with retail offices in Geneva, Switzerland and New
York, New York. The stock was traded by Baird-Patrick, a registered broker-dealer and a
member of the New York Stock Exchange with principal offices in New York, New York and a
branch office in Geneva, Switzerland. Their Switzerland office was run by Tome, a registered
representative of the firm. Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, supra note 12, at 4.
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approximately thirty dollars per share.' 5 The next day a public announcement revealed that Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. was making a cash tender offer of forty-five dollars per share for all of St. Joe's
common stock.' 6 St. Joe's stock price increased dramatically that
day,1 7 whereupon BSI informed its American brokers to liquidate the
option positions and sell the stock.' 8 A profit of nearly two million
dollars was realized by BSI's clients "virtually overnight" and was
placed in BSI's bank account with the Irving Trust Company in New
York. 19

These developments aroused the suspicion of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which promptly filed an action against
BSI and certain undisclosed purchasers in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.2 0 On March 27, 1981,
the SEC sought a temporary restraining order to prevent further
trading violations, additional orders to freeze the assets derived from
the sales of St. Joe securities, and information to gain the identities of
the unknown purchasers. 21 The SEC alleged that BSI and the undisclosed purchasers had violated the provisions of American securities
law pertaining to insider trading by acting on confidential informa22
tion relating to the acquisition of St. Joe.
On that same day, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining
order from Judge Pollack, freezing the proceeds of the stock transaction in BSI's account at Irving Trust. 3 Additionally, the order
directed discovery proceedings requiring BSI to disclose the identity of
its clients ' "insofar as permitted by law." '24 For an eight month
period, BSI refused to appropriately answer the SEC's discovery requests 25 and declined to disclose the requested information regarding

the identity of its customers, 26 maintaining that such disclosure would

1192 F.R.D. at 112.
16 Id.
17
IS

Id. at 113.
Id. BSI was instructed to perform these transactions by Tome. Amended Complaint of

Plaintiff, supra note 12, at 9.
'9 92 F.R.D. at 113.
0 Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Application For An Order Compelling Answers
And Imposing Sanctions at 1, Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs Memorandum].
21 Id. at 2.
22 Id. at 1-2.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum, sipra note 20. at 1-2.
92 F.R.D. at 113.
25 Id. The SEC propounded interrogatories and attended court conferences in an attempt to
learn the identity of the undisclosed principals. Id. These attempts, however, failed. The SEC
merely received "'[e]xplanatory but uninformative letters" from BSI concerning the identity of
the principals. Id.
26 Id.
'3

24
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violate Swiss law and thus place BSI in jeopardy of criminal sanc27
tions.
In November, 1981, the court announced in an informal opinion
that it would enter an order requiring disclosure and permit the SEC
one week within which to submit the order.2 8 The court made it clear
that a failure to comply with the disclosure order would result in the
imposition of severe contempt sanctions. 2 Subsequently, the bank
secured client waivers, furnished some of the answers to the interrogatories, and requested additional time to answer the remaining inter30
rogatories or show why it could not comply.
Although some compliance had occurred, the court could not
predict whether the bank would fully comply with the discovery order
or whether further discovery would give rise to additional defenses by
the bank. 3 1 Accordingly, the court decided "to analyze the legal situation posited." 32 Because BSI had not fully complied, the court ordered
the bank to complete its answers, but decided to withhold its final
order to allow BSI time to comply with the discovery order or explain
the reason for its failure to do so. 33 BSI eventually disclosed the
identity of its clients pursuant to the waivers it had received, thus
eliminating the necessity of the court order.34 The SEC then filed an
amended complaint naming the newly identified clients as defend35
ants.
27 Memorandum Of Defendant Banca Della Svizzera Italiana In Opposition To Plaintiff's
Application For An Order Compelling Answers And Imposing Sanctions at 9, Securities And
Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Memorandum].
28 92 F.R.D. at 113.
29 Id.
3o Id.

1 Id. at 114.
Id.
31 Id. at 119.
14 See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 30, 1981, at 3, col.
1.
11 Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, supra note 12, at 1, 6. Subsequent discovery revealed
that Edgar M. Bronfman, Seagram's Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive
Officer enjoyed a close personal and business relationship with Tome, the representative for
Baird-Patrick. Id. at 6. Before March 10, 1981, Tome was given material nonpublic information
in confidence from Seagram that a tender offer for St. Joe was forthcoming. Tome moved
rapidly to acquire St. Joe stock and options before the public announcement of the offer.
Accordingly, Tome directed BSI to buy St. Joe call options for NICO, TFCO, and Finvest
Panama (the Tome group). The order was executed by BSI through its account at Becker. Tome
also placed an order to buy St. Joe stock for BSI through Baird-Patrick. These orders were
executed and delivered to BSI's account at the Irving Trust Company. Id. at 7-8.
Claudio Nesa, Assistant Manager of BSI, confirmed the execution of these orders, but he
clearly stated that there was "no discussion of the investment motivation." Affidavit of Claudio
Nesa at 6, Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (In response to Interrogatory 7).
32
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The leading case on the conflict between discovery orders and
foreign nondisclosure laws is Societe Internationalev. Rogers.38 The
action was filed as Societe Internationale v. McGranery37 but the
leading case, although arising from the same facts, concerned a different procedural issue. 38 The case arose when the assets of a German
firm were seized by the American Government during World War
3
11. ' The seizure was carried out pursuant to section 5(b) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act 40 which enabled the United States,
through an Alien Property Custodian, to seize the property of a '"foreign country or national"' during a time of war. 41 These assets, specifically cash in American banks and ninety percent of the stock of a
Delaware corporation, were valued at more than one hundred million
dollars and were under the control of a German firm, I. G. Fabenindustraie .42
In 1948, a Swiss holding company known as Interhandel or I. G.
Chemie, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to recover the assets under section 9 of the
Trading with the Enemy Act. 43 The suit was brought against the
Treasurer of the United States and the Attorney General, successor to
the Alien Property Custodian. 44 The company claimed that it owned
the stock and cash and should be permitted to recover the assets under
section 9(a) as a national of Switzerland, a neutral country. 45 The
United States challenged the ownership claim and alleged that the
company had conspired with the German firm, a Swiss banking firm,
and others to "conceal" ownership of the assets and thus prevent

357 U.S. 197 (1958).
111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), modified and ajfd sub nom. Societe Internationale v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
11 The first action involved the original dismissal of the complaint for failure to produce
documents pursuant to a court order. See id.
11 Id. at 437.
0 ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
41 357 U.S. at 198 (quoting id.). The United States assumed control of the assets during
World War II at which time the alien property custodian was vested with title to the assets. See
id. at 198-99.
11 Id. at 199. The Delaware corporation was General Aniline-Film Corporation. Id.
43 111 F. Supp. at 437; see ch. 285, § 9(a), 42 Stat. 1511, 1511 (1923) (amending Trading
with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 9, 40 Stat. 411, 419-20 (1917)) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
41 357 U.S. at 199. Throughout the long history of this case, culminating with a settlement in
1963 by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, several United States Attorneys General have been
successors to the Alien Property Custodian. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 236; Note, Limitations on
the Federal Judicial Power To Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441,
1458 n.159 (1963).
41 357 U.S. at 199.
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seizure by the United States. 46 Thus, the United States moved to order
production of documents by the Swiss bank under rule 34 of the
47
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court granted the Government's motion for an order
compelling production of the records of the Swiss holding company's
bank. 48 The company contended that production of these bank records could lead to criminal sanctions under the penal laws of Switzerland. 49 This contention was confirmed when the Swiss Federal
Attorney "confiscated" the records upon a determination that disclosure would violate article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code dealing with
economic espionage and article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law dealing with
50
the secrecy of bank records.
The district court referred the case to a special master to make
findings of fact and determine the nature of Swiss law. 51 The master
found that: Switzerland's actions were in accordance with accepted
Swiss doctrine; no collusion was present between the Swiss Government and the company; and good faith was exercised by the company
in attempting ' "to comply with the production order" ' under the
good faith test of attempting "all which a reasonable man would have
undertaken in the circumstances." 52 The district court accepted these
findings, but ruled favorably on a motion by the American Government to dismiss the company's complaint, concluding that compliance
with Swiss law was an insufficient pretext for failure to produce the
records. 53 The court, however, did suspend the effective date of its
order to afford the company an opportunity to obtain waivers thereby
facilitating compliance with the production order.5 4 The company,
seeking "to achieve maximum compliance with the production order"
without violating Swiss law 55 offered a plan whereby a "'neutral'
expert" would be appointed to inspect the files and identify relevant
documents for production. 56 The company could then secure the documents by obtaining additional waivers, initiating Swiss arbitration
proceedings, or seeking letters rogatory. 57 The district court refused to
" 111 F. Supp. at 437.
See id. at 438.
41 Id.; see also Note, supra note 44, at 1458 n.159.
41 111 F. Supp. at 438.
17

50

Id.

11 Id. at 439.
52 357 U.S. at 201.
5' See id. at 201-02.
14 Id. at 202. Over 190,000 documents were released, however, the most relevant documents
were not produced. See id. at 202-03.
11 See id. at 203.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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accept this plan and ordered final dismissal of the case. 5' The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 59
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court,
holding that the dismissal was not justified where the "failure to
comply has been due to inability, and not. . . bad faith." '6 0 The Court
maintained that an American court may require that a party ordered
to comply with production requests make all possible efforts to identify owners of seized assets, 8' but emphasized that disclosure of the
banking records would violate Swiss law, and that "fear of criminal
prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction," which is
"not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a
foreign sovereign. ' ' 2 The Court considered this concern and the holding company's production of thousands of nonbank related documents
a "good faith" effort and sufficient grounds for permitting the company to argue the merits of the case.6 3 The Court qualified the good
faith defense by noting that this was not a case of a petitioner who
deliberately courted legal impediments, as the American government
had suggested. 64 The Court indicated that had collusion between a
foreign party and its government been established, the good faith
defense would be of no avail. 6 5 On that basis, courts have subsequently held that discovery orders may be issued by American courts
notwithstanding restrictions by a foreign country's law.6 6
Thus, two contrasting principles are derived from Societe.67 The
first provides that production may be ordered despite foreign nondisclosure laws.6 8 This principle had previously been utilized by American courts and was substantially opposed by foreign countries.6 9 The
second provides that a good faith effort is a viable defense to sanctions
7
for nonproduction . 0
Id.
Id.; see Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom.
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
1o 357 U.S. at 212-13.
61 See id. at 205.
58

59

62

Id. at 211.

63 See id. at 209-12.

61 Id. at 208-09.
65 Id.; see Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 751 (dismissal could result from
"evidence of collusion with the foreign government' ").
66 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Field v. United States, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897,
900-01 (2d Cir. 1968).
67 See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 750.
68 See supra note 66.

69 See supra note 9.
70 See, e.g., In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:91

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted Societe, 7' exhibiting substantial deference to international
comity. 72 In First National City Bank v. IRS, 73 the Second Circuit
court reinstated a subpoena requiring compliance with an IRS summons for production since it was not shown that production of the
records would violate Panamanian law or result in criminal sanctions. 74 Significantly, the court indicated that production would be
excused if that action forced a violation of Panamanian law. 75 Several
years later, in In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 76 the Second Circuit
court again considered whether a court could compel production of
documents held in a Panamanian branch of an American bank. By
this time, however, Panamanian law had made production of certain
documents a crime.7 7 The court modified a subpoena requiring production, noting that a sufficient showing had been made that produc78
tion would violate Panamanian law.
In Ings v. Ferguson,79 foreign banks attempted to quash subpoenas served upon their New York branches which required production
of documents located in Canada.8 0 The court restricted the scope of
the subpoenas and limited production to documents located in New
York, holding that letters rogatory were a proper means for obtaining
information located in foreign countries. 8 Furthermore, the court
stated that American courts should refrain from taking action that
circumvents a friendly neighbor's laws and procedures. 2 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit did not pursue the Societe Court's
intimation that production could be ordered despite foreign nondisclosure laws. Rather, the Second Circuit court treated foreign nondis83
closure laws as an absolute bar to the production of documents.
7" See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text; see also Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 517.
Because the New York and American Stock Exchanges are located within the Second Circuit, the
majority of securities cases are decided in that circuit.
" See supra note 11.
73 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
71 Id. at 618-20.
75 Id. at 619.
7- 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
77 Id. at 612. Article 89 and article 93 of Law No. 17 provided for "a fine not greater than
one hundred balboas (B/100.00)," similar to a misdemeanor under American law. 297 F.2d at
612 (quoting id.).
76 297 F.2d at 613.
7- 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
80 Id. at 150.
1' Id. at 151-53.
s1 Id. at 152.
83 See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 752. The International Law Association
maintained that this viewpoint adopted in the Second Circuit was preferable to the previously
adopted approach in which American courts issued controversial court orders requiring the
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This treatment was greatly affected by the issuance of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
Section 39 of the Restatement provides that a country is not prevented
from exercising its jurisdiction "solely" because a person would be
subject to liability under a foreign country's law. 84 In effect, the
Restatement provides that the exercise of jurisdiction should not be
85
exclusively decided on the basis of a prohibition by foreign law.
Additionally, section 40 of the Restatement provides several factors
which courts should balance when determining whether to moderate
its jurisdictional reach.8 6 Of particular importance are the competing
"vital national interests" of the respective nations and the degree of
hardship imposed upon the individual by the forum country's
action. 87 In employing a balancing of interests test, courts should
consider the concerns of both countries and the subsequent impact of
the decision upon the individual. Thus, a more informed and equita88
ble decisfon might result.
"production of documents from abroad." See infra note 171. An Association report noted that
eight countries had filed formal protests concerning these earlier American practices and further
noted that retaliatory legislation had been enacted by several nations. The report concluded that
it was difficult to find support under international law upholding American orders compelling
production. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-FIRST CONFERENCE 403-07 (Tokyo
1964) [hereinafter cited as TOKYO REPORT].
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39 (1965).
Section 39(1) provides: "A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not

precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise [is] conduct subjecting him
to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct."
85 See id. § 39 comment b.
88 Id. § 40. Section 40 provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state
is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement

actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id. But see Metzger, The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Bases and
Conflict of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 19 (1966) (international law does not require use
of § 40).
81 See SEC v. BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 117-19. Judge Pollack concentrated upon factors 40 (a) and
40 (b) and relegated the remaining factors to less significant roles. See id.
88

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 40 comment a (1965); Meal, Governmental Compulsion as a Defense Under United States and
European Community Antitrust Law, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 98-101 (1981); Note,
supra note 10, at 619-20.
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Following publication of the Restatement, the Second Circuit
court retreated from its absolute position concerning production and
adopted the Restatement's balancing test.89 In United States v. First
National City Bank,9 0 the court affirmed the district court's decision
holding the defendant bank in civil contempt for refusing to compel
its foreign branch to answer a subpoena requesting the documents
necessary for the investigation of alleged antitrust violations by the
bank's clients. 9' The court announced that antitrust laws are the
"cornerstones" of American economic policy and found this interest to
override possible civil liability for disclosure in Germany.9 2 In City
Bank the court noted that no German statute required bank secrecy
and that bankers were absent from the list of persons who may be3
subject to criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of secrets .
In Trade Development Bank v. ContinentalInsurance Co., 4 the
defendant bank refused to disclose the identity of its customers relying
on a Swiss statute that imposed criminal sanctions for such disclosure.95 The court recognized that disclosure would violate Swiss law 96
and noted that the Restatement's balancing test permitted a court "to
defer to Swiss law. -9 7 The court concluded that because the identity of
the customers was not an essential element in resolving the case,9 8 the
bank did not have to obtain waivers from its customers. 99 The court
observed that it was necessary to expand the balancing test to include
whether the requested information was needed to resolve the case. 00
Other federal courts have considered whether to apply American
law when faced with conflicting foreign nondisclosure laws.' 0 ' In In
re Grand Jury Proceedings,0 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that a foreign individual subpoenaed while in the United
States had to testify before a grand jury, notwithstanding the fact that

89 See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
-0 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
"I Id. at 905.
92 See id. at 903. See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972): United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
9 396 F.2d at 903.
469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
95 See id. at 39; see also infra note 183.
91 469 F.2d at 40.
11 Id. at 41.
98 Id.
11 Id. The court also doubted that customer waivers would have vielded useful evidence. Id.
10oId. The court commented that in balancing the interests, "the relative unimportance of the
information as to the clients' identity . . . was entitled to be considered." Id.
101See infra notes 102-34 and accompanying text.
102 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Field, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
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his native country could impose criminal sanctions for such an act. 03
Although the court recognized the delicate position in which the
individual had been placed, 104 after weighing the competing interests,
it concluded that the "significant [national] interest" in enforcing the
tax laws through the use of the grand jury outweighed the foreign
interest. 105
In United States v. Vetco,1 06 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order and enforcement of contempt sanctions against Vetco Inc., its accountants, and its lawyers for
noncompliance with summonses requesting certain documents.'0 7 In
affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit court observed that
there is no "absolute bar" to disclosure or contempt sanctions for
failure to disclose "whenever compliance is prohibited by foreign
law."10 8 Moreover, the court maintained that the district court had
not found that disclosure would violate Swiss law. 0 9 The court considered it important that disclosure was sought pursuant to an IRS
criminal summons since "[s]uch summonses are . . . more widely
recognized in the international community" than disclosure orders
issued pursuant to civil discovery." 0 The court next balanced the
competing Swiss and American interests"' and determined that the
American interest in enforcement of the summonses outweighed the
2
competing Swiss interest."
In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 1 3 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered a motion
seeking to compel production of documents held by some fifteen
defendants under various laws of four foreign nations." 4 The court
"03Id.

at 405.
See id. at 410.
1"5 See id. at 407-10.
106 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 671 (1981).
017 Id. at 1326.
104

101 Id. at 1329.

l09 Id. at 1330. The court noted that the district court determined that the records ordered to
be produced were not the type of records designed to be protected by the Swiss statute. Id. at
1330 n.7.
110 Id.; cf. Convention on Double Taxation of Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, art. XVI, para. 1, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (disclosure of tax materials
permitted only for assessment and collection of taxes). The Swiss have recently recognized the
importance of disclosure of tax materials for domestic and foreign purposes and have accordingly
facilitated the release of these materials pursuant to Swiss law. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 257;
Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 18, 60-63 (1978).
'" See 644 F.2d at 1330-33. The Ninth Circuit court held that the factors listed in § 40 of the
Restatement were the proper factors to be balanced. Id. at 1331.
"l
Id. at 1333.
113 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
11 Id. at 1143-44.
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refused to use the Restatement balancing test in its analysis, instead
calling it unworkable in this instance, and suggested that it was not
within the function of the judiciary to evaluate a foreign country's
social and economic policies. 1 5 However, the court balanced three
factors similar to the Restatement factors in arriving at its decision to
issue production orders:1 16 the strength of the American interest;11 7 the
crucial nature of the documents in deciding the case;" 8 and, the
flexibility of the foreign nation in applying its nondisclosure law." 9
The court, emphasizing the importance of effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws,120 held that this interest coupled with the importance of the documents in deciding the case outweighed the foreign
nations' interest in applying its nondisclosure law,' 2' and thus ordered
22
production of the documents.
In Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 12 3 the state alleged that
Andersen failed to indicate in financial statements that it had prepared, the relationship between a foreign company and a company to
which Ohio had loaned money. 24 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit examined the validity of the district court's imposition of
sanctions upon Andersen for its failure to produce documents which
the state requested during discovery proceedings. 25 Andersen did not
produce the documents, maintaining that production would violate
Swiss law,' 2 however, the company waited more than a year following the court order for production before attempting to justify the
Swiss defense. 27 Eventually, the company determined that Swiss law
was not applicable to the documents it possessed and withdrew its
reliance on the Swiss defense. 2 8 These events led the court to hold that

"5 Id. at 1148; see Note, Ordering Productionof Documents, supra note 9, at 804-05; see also
id. at 804 n.52 (construing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)).
"11 See 480 F. Supp. at 1154-56.

17 Id. at 1154.

IId. at 1154-55.
"

Id.

at 1155.

120See id. at 1154-55; see also First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903; supra note 92.
'21 See 480 F. Supp. at 1154-56.
122 Id.

at 1156.
23 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
124 Id. at 1372.
125 See id. at 1372-76.
126 Id. at 1372-73.

I"7 Id. at 1374. The court observed that Andersen did not specify the Swiss law upon which it
relied in invoking this "foreign law" defense. Id.
'

See id.
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the sanctions were an appropriate response to Andersen's "flagrant
29
bad faith and callous disregard." 1
In In re Westinghouse,'130 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit determined that an order imposing sanctions on an American
company for noncompliance with a discovery order requesting production of documents was not proper because disclosure would violate
the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations.13 ' The
court recognized that the defendant had made a diligent effort to
obtain a waiver from the Canadian government and noted the strong
Canadian interest in controlling the development and application of
atomic energy.1 32 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the American interest in disclosure was weak since the case did not involve a
grand jury investigation or enforcement of the antitrust laws. 133 The
court concluded that the Canadian interest outweighed the American
interest and accordingly rejected the district court's reasoning that the
"law of the forum would prevail, regardless of the particular facts of
1 34
the case."
The confrontation between American discovery orders and foreign nondisclosure laws is resolved through a balancing test with good
faith considerations.1 35 Although it is difficult to reach a consensus as
to when American courts should refrain from applying federal law to
foreign defendants, two maxims emerge from application of the balancing test. First, American courts are inclined to rule in favor of
disclosure pursuant to discovery orders despite the presence of other
interests. 13 This occurs even though such action has historically
brought protests from foreign governments and consequent nondisclosure or retaliatory legislation.1 37 Second, American courts are reluctant to issue an order forcing one to violate a foreign country's
38
criminal laws. 1
In BSI v. SEC, the district court confronted a situation in which
both maxims were examined. Specifically, the court had to analyze
2I Id. at 1376. The Andersen court did not balance the competing Swiss and American

interests and, in fact, did not even consider the possible application of Swiss law. See id.
"3 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
'3' Id. at 994.
132 Id. at 995-96.
133 Id. at 999.
134 Id. The Tenth Circuit court observed that the district court erred in failing to balance the
appropriate competing interests. Id.
"I See generally Meal, supra note 88; Note, supra note 10, at 616, 619-20.
13' See Note, supra note 10, at 621 (international comity frequently subordinated to American
interests).
137 See supra note 9; infra note 171. See generally supra note 83.
"I See Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 527. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d at 410
(disclosure order forced party to violate legal commands of Cayman Islands).
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the American interest, i.e. maintaining the integrity of the securities
market, with the Swiss interest, i.e. nondisclosure and the consequential imposition of criminal liability for unauthorized disclosure.1 39 In
pursuing this analysis, Judge Pollack adopted the Restatement balancing test thereby considering the vital national interests of both countries, the hardship that Swiss law would impose upon the bank employees for disclosure, and the presence of good faith
40
considerations. 1
The court stated that there was a strong American governmental
interest in ensuring the "integrity of its financial markets" through the
enforcement of its securities law, and acknowledged that this interest
was frustrated by "the use of foreign bank accounts."' 141 The court
observed that there was no corresponding Swiss governmental interest
of similar magnitude 42 and indicated the fact that neither government had opposed discovery was probative of this since a foreign
government would object if a vital national interest were threatened. 43 The court maintained that the secrecy privilege belonged to
the bank customer and was not required to protect a public interest or
a Swiss governmental interest. 44 Furthermore, the court stated that
there was some flexibility in the application of the Swiss law. 145 It was
admitted that Swiss law might subject the bank to fines and its officers
to imprisonment, yet the court noted that there were two alternatives
which the bank could embrace to prevent this. 146 First, by obtaining
waivers from its customers, the bank could insulate itself from criminal liability. 47 Second, article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code 148 relieves a
party from criminal liability for acts done to protect one's own good
"I See 92 F.R.D. at 112.
140Id. at 117-19. The court did consider the other factors delineated in the Restatement
balancing test, but observed that these additional factors were less significant than the aforementioned factors. See id. at 119. See inJra note 154.
u4 92 F.R.D. at 117.
42 See id.

See id. at 117-18; cf. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 27, at 27 (quoting statement
of Dr. Rudolph Gerber, Swiss Federal Attorney General, reprinted in Affidavit of Chester J.
Straub, exhibit P, Securities And Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)) (Swiss government will prosecute one who discloses records
without permission, but magnitude of governmental interest does not mandate governmental
confiscation of records).
" 92 F.R.D. at 118; accord Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 n.3
(2d Cir. 1972) ("Swiss bank secrecy law was enacted primarily to protect the right of privacy of
clients, the client is the 'master of the secret' "); see also Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret from
a Legal View, 18 INT'L. & ComP. L.Q. 360 (1969).
141 92 F.R.D. at 118.
146 Id.
147Id.
14' See STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 34.
'4'
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where the party is not responsible for the present conflict and cannot
be expected to abandon his own best interest. 149 Judge Pollack opined
that the second alternative might not be available if the Swiss government concluded, as the court had, that BSI was responsible for the
conflict. 50 The court next considered the good faith efforts of BSI. It
indicated that as an agent or principal, the bank certainly profited in
some manner from invading the American securities market, and then
deliberately attempted to escape liability for insider trading by using
the Swiss nondisclosure law to "shield" its activities from American
laws. 1 5' The court observed that BSI deliberately courted legal impediments and thus acted in bad faith. 52 The court maintained that a
contrary result would be a "travesty of justice," therefore, it refused to
the
countenance BSI's behavior. 53 Accordingly, the court held 5 that
4
American interest outweighed the competing Swiss interest.
Although the problem of extraterritoriality is not a new one, SEC
v. BSI extends the Restatement's section 40 balancing test into the
uncharted territory which exists when American securities law and
the Swiss bank nondisclosure law conflict. 55 This case highlights the
potential unworkability of the section 40 balancing test in attempting
to measure the depth of the competing American and Swiss interests
and the difficulty courts face in balancing the relevant factors. Yet,
without a treaty outlining the resolution of conflicts, the judiciary
must resolve these controversies. BSI v. SEC illustrates the potential
problems that may result from requiring the judiciary to decide questions that affect the relations between two countries. 56
An analysis of the strength of the United States' interest in the
integrity of its securities market as measured against the competing
Swiss interest involves a consideration of both positive and negative
factors resulting from enforcement of the securities laws. It is recognized that complete disclosure of all relevant information is necessary

1 92 F.R.D. at 118. The article 34 defense has not been invoked often. In fact, no cases
factually similar to SEC v. BSI have been decided based upon this defense. See Lowenfeld, Bank
Secrecy and Insider Trading: The Banca Della Svizzera Italiana Case, 15 THE REv. OF SEC. REG.
942 (1982).
1-o92 F.R.D. at 118. The court emphasized BSIs "active part in the insider trading transactions" in deciding that BSI was responsible for the conflict. Id.; see supra notes 12-19 and
accompanying text.
"1' 92 F.R.D. at 117.
152 Id. at 118-19; see also Societe, 357 U.S. at 208-09.
'5' 92 F.R.D. at 119.
See id. The Court also considered the remaining Restatement factors and concluded that
"
they offered further support for advancing the American interest. See id.
155 Lowenfeld, supra note 149, at 945.
'56 See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text.
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to promote the effective operation of the American securities mar7
ket. 15
Federal legislation reflects the American interest in the effective
operation of the American securities market. 158 Underlying this inter-

117 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78j(b) (1976); cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2193 (J. MeNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) ("duty to attend and disclose all that is needed for the ascertainment of truth
applies" to all evidentiary material including documents). Underlying this "complete disclosure"
theory is the premise that a profiteering party benefitting from deceitful, fraudulent, or covert
transactions shall be identified and held accountable for all profits obtained via these transactions. Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934); see, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see also infra note 158.
'58 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Particularly important to the present discussion
are sections 10(b) and 14(e).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly. by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, an\
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
To facilitate the operation of these provisions, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
created by 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976), promulgated rules lOb-5 and 14e-3 pursuant to its authority
under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1976). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, .14e-3 (1981). Courts have
traditionally applied these provisions and the rules promulgated thereunder to domestic parties
guilty of fraudulent activity. Furthermore, some courts have maintained that the American
interest in the market's integrity extends beyond the boundaries of the United States, and
accordingly have extraterritorially applied these provisions and rules. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200, 206, modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (Congress intended "to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities" through extraterritorial
application of Securities Exchange Act); accord IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918-21 (2d Cir.
1980); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); see
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416(1) (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1981; Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (courts of United States maintain jurisdiction for any
transaction carried out on American securities market). See generally Becker, Extraterritorial
Dimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 233 (1969); Hacker &
Rotunda, supra note 8, at 648.
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est is the principle of fairness 1 9 which requires that investors should
have equal access to information that can influence their trading. 60
Similarly, traders lacking inside knowledge of the conditions of the
market should be protected from those traders receiving such information. 1" Only then can the American interest in a creditable securities
market be maintained. Balanced against this positive factor are negative considerations which may dilute the strength of the American
interest. In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,162 the Supreme Court continued its trend of denying federal relief for alleged claims of fraudulent securities transactions.16 3 In Santa Fe, the Court considered minority shareholders' requests either to set aside a merger or to recover
the true value of their shares. 6 4 Both remedies were sought pursuant
to the shareholders' claims that rule lOb-5 prohibiting fraudulent
conduct in transactions involving securities had been violated. 6 5 The
Supreme Court held that the majority shareholders' conduct was
neither deceptive nor manipulative under the statute and therefore
could not be considered fraudulent. 66 Thus, the Court concluded that
it would be ' "appropriate in this instance to relegate respondent and
others in his situation to whatever remedy is created by state law." ' 17
The Court noted an appraisal remedy was available in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, 68 and indicated that it would not extend federal
securities law "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent"
since such an extension would interfere with traditional state corpo69
rate law.
Santa Fe illustrates the United States Supreme Court's diminishing concern in broadening federal securities regulation.170 By relegat"I Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307,
1355 (1981).
160SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); see Barry, supra note 159, at 1355 n.171.
161 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944).
162 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
163 See infra note 170.
'8

430 U.S. at 467.

ia

Id. See supra note 158.

'

430 U.S. at 474.
7 Id. at 478 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977)). See generally Cort

v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1 430 U.S. at 466-67.

19 Id. at 479.

"0 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (no implied cause of action for defeated
tender offeror under § 14(e)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter or
intention to defraud essential for lOb-5 violations); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (10b-5 claimants limited to securities purchasers and sellers); Note, Supreme
Court and the Counter Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979); Note,
Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule 10b-5: An End To The Rule As Law?, 1976 DuKE L. J. 789.
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ing the plaintiff to a state remedy, the Court refused to construe
expansively federal law, and thereby denied the shareholders the
protections afforded by the uniformity of federal law. The Court, in
denying shareholders the protection of uniform federal securities law
and instead forcing aggrieved shareholders to rely on disparate state
law, has failed to treat the American interest in the integrity of the
securities market as highly significant. Therefore, there is at least
some doubt as to whether this interest is strong enough to unequivocally predominate a foreign interest, particularly a foreign statute
imposing criminal sanctions for disclosure.
There are additional factors to be considered in determining the
strength of the American interest. In measuring the propriety of extraterritorial application of American securities law, the imminence of
retaliatory legislation and action on the part of foreign countries must
be considered. The possibility of coerced disclosure may prompt foreign countries to raise additional restrictions on disclosure or more
stringently enforce existing laws."'7 In response to these possible disclosure orders, foreigners and their financial agents may withdraw a
large proportion of the funds currently held in the United States
securities market and thus trade solely on foreign exchanges. 72 A
reduced volume of transactions on the American market of this
magnitude would have a cataclysmic effect on the American balance
of payments, international trade, and commissions and income for
financial personnel, as well as the general liquidity of the economy
and securities market. 7 3 Thus, in analyzing a national interest, one
cannot examine it isolated from other equally important domestic
factors.
In addition to considering the diverse factors which determine
the strength of the American interest, courts are faced with the bur-

17
Foreign countries have expressed vociferous opposition to extraterritorial application of
American law. See TOKYo REPORT, supra note 83, at 403-06: Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 518-21.
International displeasure with such American imperialism has been pointedly expressed in
legislation aimed at halting American discovery efforts and restricting jurisdictional expansion.
See Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 520 (listing retaliatory legislation of Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Japan, Norway, Philippines, and Sweden): Note, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at
847 n.1 (listing retaliatory legislation of Canada and United Kingdom). See generally Note,
Subpoena of Documents Located in ForeignJurisdiction Where Law of Situs ProhibitsRemoval,
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1962); supra note 9.
172 See Statement of Carl W. Desch, senior vice president of the First National City Bank of
New York, reprintedin 116 CONC. REC. 32,631 (1970); Telegram from Henry C. Froy, chairman
of the Foreign Committee of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reprinted in
116 CONc. REG. 32,631 (1970).
113 See generally 116 CONG. REC. 32,629-32 (1970). But cf. id. at 32,627-29 (stricter disclosure
promotes greater integrity in securities market and will counterbalance adverse effects).
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den of discovering the underlying interests of foreign laws, thereby
increasing the complexity of this judicial duty. This complex task is
particularly manifest when courts balance forum interests with the
Swiss interest in bank secrecy.
Swiss secrecy laws are deeply rooted in Switzerland's history, 174
thus illustrating the firm Swiss belief in an individual's right to
privacy. 7 5 Privacy, or "'sphere of secrecy,"' has been viewed as part
of the individual's "personality rights,"'17 an essential factor in the
personal liberty of Swiss citizens. 177 An important element of this
personal liberty is the privacy of financial affairs, in particular the
confidentiality between banker and client. 78 Traditionally, the importance of this principle of secrecy has been sustained through Swiss
custom and usage. 17 In 1934, the international banking crisis 0 coupled with attempts by Hitler's forces to uncover assets in Switzerland' 8 ' prompted statutory protection of the bank secrecy principle. Enacting the Banking Law of 1934, the Swiss Parliament placed
approval on the long established tenet of Swiss society that individual
arrangements in banking are personal matters. 182 Article 47 of the
Swiss Banking Law provides:
Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as
officer, employee, mandatory, liquidator or commissioner of a
bank . . .or who has become aware of such a secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months
83
or by a fine not exceeding 50,000 francs.

See Swiss Banks and Secrecy Laws: Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-1970); Dagon, Securities Regulation in
Switzerland, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 511 (1973); Friedrich, The Anonymous Bank Account in
Switzerland, 79 BANKINC L. J. 961, 964 (1962); Kelly, supra note 1, at 212; Meyer, supra note
110, at 24; Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 CEO. WASH.
L. REV. 284, 288 (1955); Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 360, 361
(1969); Note, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128 (1966); Note, Swiss Banks
and the Avoidance of American Tax and Securities Laws: An Assessment Based on Proposed
Legislation, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 94 (1970).
1 See ZGB, C.C., CoD. civ. art. 28. See generally, Meyer, supra note 110, at 20.
78 Meyer, supra note 110, at 20; Meyer, supra note 174, at 287.
Friedrich, supra note 174, at 964.
See Meyer, supra note 110 at 22; Mueller, supra note 174, at 361.
179 See Meyer, supra note 174, at 288.
0SO
See id.; Meyer, supra note 110, at 25.
's' Meyer, supra note 110, at 26.
178

'

183

Id. at 22.
STGB, C.P.

COD. PiN.

art. 47, reprinted in

RELATING TO BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS

UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND,

FEDERAL LAW

4 (1972). See generally Meyer, supra note 110, at 24-27.
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Thus, article 47 provides criminal liability in the form of imprisonment for the disclosure of bank secrets. Article 47 evidences the Swiss
8 4
national interest in maintaining secrecy in banking transactions.1
Economic factors further evidence this interest. 8 5 The banking business helps the Swiss maintain a favorable balance of payments and
generally affects the entire Swiss economy. 1 6 A foreign nation's attempt to limit bank secrecy would be detrimental to Swiss national
interests since bank secrecy is the salient feature which has enabled the
8 7
Swiss banking business to obtain its lofty status.1
Nevertheless, bank secrecy is not an absolute privilege in Switzerland. 18 On the federal level, both the Swiss Federal Laws of Civil
Procedure and Criminal Procedure require a public duty of testimony.189 Neither Code absolutely exempts bankers from this requirement. 910 Article 42 (2) of the Federal Law of Civil Procedure, however, permits a judge to exempt witnesses from revealing professional
secrets "on a case-by-case basis."'' 9 1 On the more frequently used
cantonal level, 9 2 the Cantonal Codes of Criminal Procedure fail to
exempt a banker from a public duty to testify in criminal proceedings.1 93 The Cantonal Codes of Civil Procedure are divided in their
approach to the exemption-disclosure issue. The Codes require testimony in all circumstances or allow the judge to exercise discretion in
deciding to order testimony or permit one to refuse to give testimony. 94 Thus, according to Swiss law bank employees will be required to disclose information in certain instances. 195 Nevertheless, the
inroads made into the secrecy privilege have been limited by Swiss

184 Meyer, supra note 110, at 26. Furthermore, article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code, STGB,
C.P. COD. PEN. art. 162, illustrates the breadth of the secrecy principal by establishing criminal
liability for the disclosure of manufacturing or business secrets which one has a contractual duty
to guard. Id.; see also STGB, C.P. CoD. P N. art. 273 (crime to disclose business secret to foreign
source); Jenckel & Rider, The Swiss Approach to InsiderDealing, 128 NEW L. J. 683, 684 (1978);
Meyer, supra note 110, at 26.
5 See Meyer, supra note 110, at 53.
Is at 53 & n.209.
id.
'8
See id. at 53.
188Id. at 29. But cf. FEDERAL LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE POCEDUaRE (exemption provided for
bankers in most instances).
' Meyer, supra note 110, at 31.
190Id.
1 IId. at 31 n.79.
9 Most cases are considered on the cantonal level as the federal rules apply only to cases
before the Federal Supreme Court and federal administrative authorities. Thus, cantonal courts
hear "the bulk of criminal, civil, and administrative cases." Id. at 31 n.82.
"I Id. at 31. '
194 Id. at 31-32.
195 Id.
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courts to their own proceedings 9 6 excepting specific treaties providing
for disclosure. 197
In the absence of a treaty, the Swiss will respond positively to
foreign requests for legal assistance only if the activity condemned by
the foreign courts is also indictable under Swiss law.19 8 Since insider
trading is not a crime in Switzerland, the Swiss would not provide
legal assistance to a foreign court seeking to pursue insider trading
violations.19 9 However, a proposal which would make insider trading
a criminal offense was placed before the Swiss Government more than
four years ago, but no action has yet been taken. 20 0 One reason may be
the Swiss Government's perception that the Swiss citizenry would not
approve a change which would further impair the operation of its
secrecy law.
The strong Swiss interest in maintaining secrecy in banking transactions, although restricted in certain domestic instances, is as important as the strong American interest in maintaining the integrity of its
financial markets. In view of this, it is difficult to conclude that the
American interests should unequivocally predominate the Swiss interests.
The Restatement's balancing test provides little guidance for resolving the ostensibly irreconcilable interests of two nations. Consequently, the judiciary is placed in the untenable position of evaluating
distinctive and competing interests which occupy corresponding positions in each nation's national policy.2 0' Because this aspect of the
balancing test does not provide a workable solution to this problem,
the Restatement's hardship consideration inquiry becomes increasingly important. This inquiry requires a consideration of "the extent
and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person. ' 20 2 In considering "the extent and the
nature of the hardship," courts should recognize that some "degree of
protection" may be afforded the individual at the "expense" of the
state's interest. 20 3 Particularly, courts should contemplate the penalty
" See Trade Dev. Bank, 469 F.2d at 39-41 (article 204 of Ticino Canton exempting professionals from testifying inapplicable to proceeding in United States Court).
191E.g., Treat' on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United StatesSwitzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (providing mutual disclosure in criminal
matters); Convention on Double Taxation of Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland,
2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (providing mutual disclosure in tax matters).
' See Meyer, supra note 110, at 54-55 ("This principle was expressly provided for in the
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters as well as in all subsequent
treaties").
11" Jenckel & Rider, supra note 184, at 683, see N.Y. Times, March 4, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
200Jenckel & Rider, vipra note 184, at 684.
201 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF "iHE UNITED STATES § 40 (b) (1965).
103 Id. § 40 comment c.
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which may be imposed by the other state in deciding whether to
2
exercise jurisdiction . 04
In SEC v. BSI, the court acknowledged that imprisonment may
20
result because of the disclosure order imposed upon the bank.

5

Im-

prisonment is undoubtedly an extreme hardship and in situations in
which it is a distinct possibility, courts employing the balancing test
should assign it a weight commensurate with its importance to the
innocently threatened parties. 20 6 Thus, the hardship to which bank
employees may be subjected should induce a court to recognize the
foreign interest above the American interest. Since the Swiss have
imposed imprisonment in discovery situations, 207 and the Swiss Federal Attorney has indicated that his office would investigate and
prosecute a violation, 20 8 there is sufficient probative evidence of ensuing hardship thereby mandating that courts refrain from requiring
disclosure in bank secrecy-securities cases.
If a court orders disclosure and a defendant fails to comply, it
should refrain from imposing sanctions where the defendant has acted
in good faith. The "good faith" doctrine requires a defendant to make
a reasonable effort to gain a sovereign's consent to produce records
which are barred from production by that sovereign's law.2 0 9 How-

ever, a good faith standard is difficult to measure. 210 In SEC v. BSI,
the court found that the bank acted in bad faith because it engaged in
illegal transactions expecting to rely on foreign law to place it beyond
the purview of American securities laws. 2 1' The court rejected the

bank's claim of good faith, summarily stating: "BSI acted in bad faith.
It made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade in a commercial transaction for profit to it, the strictures of American securities law against insider trading."

2 12

The court provided no guidance in

explaining how it arrived at its conclusion. 21 3 Nevertheless, the Societe
Court outlined the parameters of the good faith analysis. For good
See id.
92 F.R.D. at 118.
201 In most investigated transactions, it is likely that threatened bank employees trading
securities have no knowledge of the principal's motives. See Mieyer, supra note 110. at 51-52.
207 See Jenckel & Rider, supra note 184, at 689 n.9 (conviction for revealing business secrets);
cf. 185 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1971) (French officials jailed for investigating secret assets in Switzerland).
See generally Meyer, supra note 174.
205 See Lowenfeld, supra note 149, at 943. But see Note, Recent Developments. supra note 9,
at 757 (likelihood of actual prosecution and imprisonment doubtful).
200 In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1952); see
Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 511.
210 See Note, supra note 10, at 619 & n.40.
21 92 F.R.D. at 117-19.
"2 Id. at 117.
213 See id.
204
205

19821
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faith to exist, a party must maximize his efforts to disclose the ordered
information. 21 4 The Court also indicated that if collusion existed between the party from whom disclosure is ordered and the foreign
government, a good faith claim would rarely be justified. 21 5 An examination of BSI's efforts reveals that it did in fact make a good faith
effort to comply with the court's disclosure order. The bank, recognizing that absolute compliance with the court's discovery order could
subject it to Swiss criminal penalties, attempted to obtain waivers
from its clients and presented alternative discovery means so that the
information could be released without violating Swiss law and still
satisfy the court's demand for disclosure.21 " Furthermore, the court's
assertion that BSI " 'deliberate[ly] court[ed]" ' legal impediments to
2
make use of the Swiss secrecy laws is unsupported by evidence. 7
The conflict between American discovery orders seeking disclosure of information for alleged fraudulent securities transactions and
the Swiss nondisclosure laws imposing criminal liability poses a special
dilemma. The two major considerations in resolving the dilemma are
the respective nations' vital national interests and potential hardship
upon the person ordered to disclose information. Under a vital national interests test, the American interest in the integrity of its financial market and the Swiss interest in bank secrecy cannot be satisfactorily balanced. Thus, courts should closely examine the hardship
considerations and good faith claims to reach an equitable decision.
The possibility of criminal imprisonment of an employee, particularly
a party innocent of wrongdoing, is a concern which sufficiently subordinates the American interest. Finally, a good faith analysis will
provide the deciding factor to ensure that an equitable result is
reached. If a party refuses to comply with a discovery order requiring
disclosure after a court engages in this analysis, the noncomplying
party should be subject to sanctions.
The court's cursory evaluation and analysis of the hardship consideration and good faith claim illustrate the court's obstinate refusal
to truly recognize the competing concerns and international repercussions inherent in its shortsighted decision. Although the immediate
effect of SEC v. BSI is tempered since waivers were eventually ob-

214 357 U.S. at 205; see also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
215

357 U.S. at 208-09; see also sopro notes 64-66 and accompanying text.

216 See 92 F.R.D. at 113; Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 27, at 5-6, 8, 38.
217 The only evidence which the court presented to support its conclusion that BSI acted

collusively was "that BSI . . . deposited the proceeds of [the challenged] transactions in an
American bank account in its name and . . . certainly profited in some measure from the
challenged activity." 92 F.R.D. at 118-19.
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tained by BSI, the effect of future decisions based upon the analysis
adopted in SEC v. BSI could be alarming. Therefore, it is doubtful
whether it is wise to continue to permit the judiciary to resolve
matters as internationally sensitive as these. If the American interest
in the integrity of its financial markets is truly a vital national interest,
a treaty with the Swiss should be negotiated to avoid any individual
hardships or international tensions resulting from shortsighted judicial
action. 218 The treaty should permit bank employees to disclose information without the threat of imprisonment. Disclosure would only be
proper in specific instances, e.g., an American court order or diplomatic request pertaining to precise securities violations. Thus the
Swiss bank secrecy privilege would effectively remain viable. Admittedly, negotiating these changes with a foreign country may be a
difficult task, 21 9 but considering the delicate nature of this dilemma,
negotiation is undoubtedly more attractive than expansion of American law abroad.
John G. Geppert, Jr.
28 Other methods include: (1) encouraging the SEC to make formal requests to the Justice
Department seeking legal assistance from the Swiss Government in obtaining the identities of
those suspected of insider trading violations; (2) making insider trading a crime in Switzerland
thus permitting the application of the Swiss-American Mutual Assistance Treaty in American
court proceedings; and, (3) utilizing letters rogatory more efficiently. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1982, at Al, col. 3; Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1982, at 36, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 4, 1982, at D13,
col. 1.
219 Currently, talks are proceeding between the United States and Switzerland aimed at
resolving this conflict. See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1982, at D13, col. 1.

